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Abstract
We examine the impact of audit committee (AC) characteristics (e.g. AC foreign members, 
AC female members, AC members with multiple directorships, AC members with share 
ownership and AC with financial and supervisory expertise) on forward-looking disclo-
sure (FLD) quality and quantity. Using a sample of Omani financial companies listed on 
Muscat Securities Market over a five-year period (2014–2018), we find that a number of 
AC characteristics (such as AC size, AC female members and AC with multiple director-
ships) improve FLD quality. We make no such observation for FLD quantity. The results 
suggest that the responsibility of AC extends to improving the quality of FLD. We provide 
an additional analysis on the impact of AC effectiveness (ACE) on FLD quality, which 
suggests that companies’ compliance with CG code is beneficial for disclosure quality. We 
also find that the impact of ACE on FLD quality is influenced by corporate performance, 
leverage and the quality of external auditors. Our findings carry implications for the regula-
tory bodies’ efforts in encouraging companies to improve disclosure quality by considering 
AC characteristics as well as appointing more effective AC directors.
Keywords Disclosure quality · Disclosure quantity · Audit committee · Corporate 
governance code · Forward-looking disclosure · Oman
JEL Classification G3 · M4 · M48
1 Introduction
Prior research shows that corporate governance (CG) mechanisms improve the quality 
and quantity of corporate reporting (e.g. Abdou et al. 2020; Grassa et al. 2020). The audit 
committee (AC) is considered as one of the main CG mechanisms upon which predicated 
stakeholders hope in constraining the behaviour of corporate managers (Gendron and Béd-
ard 2006). In our paper, we investigate the impact of AC characteristics on the quality and 
quantity of forward-looking disclosure (FLD) in the chairman statement. The corporate 
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board of directors (BODs) and its committees, such as AC, are relevant CG mechanisms 
that oversee managerial actions (Fama and Jensen 1983; Blue Ribbon Report 1999; Smith 
Report 2003; Lu and Boateng 2018; Jouida 2019). AC members have great control over 
the information to be disclosed in annual reports to protect shareholders’ interests (Li et al. 
2008; Haji 2015; Abad and Bravo 2018).
AC plays a crucial role in fulfilling investors’ needs for clear, relevant, and complete 
information to reduce information asymmetry and agency cost and align the interests of 
both shareholders and managers (Samaha et al. 2015). As a result of increased concerns 
about CG and financial reporting after financial scandals that were witnessed around the 
world, regulators introduce rules and recommendations to enhance CG practice in general 
and AC effectiveness in particular to improve financial reporting and disclosure practice 
to protect shareholder interests (Dezoort et al. 2002; Abad and Bravo 2018; Sultana et al. 
2019). We examine the impact of CG reforms on FLD on narrative disclosure practice in 
emerging economies, with a particular focus on Oman.
Oman provides a unique country context in which to examine the impact of AC charac-
teristics on disclosure quality and quantity. It is the first country in the Middle East region 
to issue the CG code in 2002. The code was revised in 2016, giving ACs extended roles 
and responsibilities to perform their tasks through the fulfillment of two main functions, 
the managerial monitoring, as well as the resource provision function (Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) 2015). The CG code requires some specific characteristics on AC mem-
bers, for instance, the majority of AC members are required to be independent, including 
the AC chair; moreover, at least one member of the AC should be an accounting or finan-
cial expert. These characteristics, such as AC independence, AC with financial expertise 
and AC with multiple directorships may be necessary for the AC members to better under-
take their duties of overseeing financial reporting. These duties require a comprehensive 
knowledge of accounting standards, practices and procedures to aid AC members in over-
seeing financial reporting. This puts them in the right place to formulate corporate decision 
on behalf of the board, which are required to be on a timely basis (Pugliese et al. 2009), 
including decisions related to disclosure practice. However, research on the impact of dif-
ferent characteristics of AC directors on disclosure is scarce (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; 
Chan et  al. 2013; Wang and Hussainey 2013). Our study contributes to the literature by 
exploring how AC characteristics affect FLD practice.
The question of what factors affect corporate disclosure practice (quality and quantity) 
has been extensively examined in the literature. For instance, Hassan and Marston (2019 p. 
42) review disclosure studies and conclude that “Future research might also investigate the 
interactions between the different dimensions, the different time orientation and the differ-
ent types of disclosure, their determinants and consequences, and how they compare. For 
example, how does the quality of concurrent voluntary disclosure compare to the quality of 
forward-looking voluntary disclosure?”. Prior literature uses disclosure quantity as a proxy 
for disclosure quality (e.g. Hussainey et al. 2003). In our paper, we test to see if FLD quan-
tity is a good proxy for FLD quality. We also examine the impact of the characteristics of 
AC members (e.g. AC foreign members, AC female members, AC members with multiple 
directorships, AC members with share ownership and AC with financial and supervisory 
expertise) on FLD quality and quantity.
Our paper offers a number of contributions. First, we extend prior research by providing 
new evidence, using a unique hand-collected data, on how AC characteristics such as mul-
tiple AC directorships, AC female members and (AC with financial expertise) positively 
and (negatively) affect FLD quality. We emphasise how these characteristics provide ACs 
with specialised resources and comprehensive knowledge, and how these characteristics 
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would enhance FLD. This paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to explore the 
impact of a comprehensive set of AC characteristics on the quality and quantity of FLD in 
the context of Oman.
Second, while we simply count the number of FLD statements as a proxy for disclosure 
quantity, we use Beattie et al. (2004)’s methodology in measuring FLD quality. We analyse 
four quality dimensions: financial, quantitative, tone and time period orientations. We pro-
vide empirical evidence for the widely held, but heretofore empirically, undocumented in 
the Omani context, that disclosure quantity is not a good proxy for disclosure quality. We 
introduce new variables to the AC-disclosure literature in the Omani context, such as AC 
size, AC meetings frequency, AC independence, AC female members, AC multiple direc-
torships, AC with financial expertise and AC foreign members. We also introduce a num-
ber of country-specific variables, such as royal members and relative (family) members on 
the board.
Third, we are the first, to the best of our knowledge, to study a unique sample period 
from 2014 to 2018, which allows us to analyse the impact of the revised CG code on dis-
closure practice in financial institutions. We also believe that these institutions are impor-
tant and worthy of investigation, as these are the pillar of the economy and connected 
directly to Oman Vision 2040 (2019).
Finally, the majority of the previous studies have used agency theory to explain the 
impact of AC characteristics on disclosure practice (e.g. Haji 2015; Abad and Bravo 2018). 
Adopting one theory might be quite restrictive in explanation of a practice; we believe that 
there is a need of a set of theories to explain the impact of AC characteristics on FLD quan-
tity and quality. We are adopting agency, resource-dependence and social capital theories, 
which we believe are not competing but complementing each other.
The paper is organised as follows. Section  2 discusses the institutional context. Sec-
tion 3 reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the method-
ology. Section 5 discusses the findings. Section 6 provides additional analyses and Section 
concludes.
2  Institutional background
In 2002, Oman was the first country in the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as 
in the emerging markets to issue the CG code (Baydoun et al. 2013). Different steps were 
taken by the Omani government to enhance financial reporting (Dry 2003). Moreover, the 
Omani government adopted many steps to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Muscat Securities Market (MSM) and the financial sector for developing the country’s 
economy. The Omani CG code identifies the characteristics of the BODs, AC, external 
auditors and internal control, executive management and the related party transactions. The 
CG code is revised in 2015 and published in 2016. The revised code identifies a principal 
responsibility of the AC as being the assessment of the integrity of internal controls and a 
company’s risk management framework (CMA 2015). The AC is also responsible for over-
sight and timely preparation of financial reports. The code recommends that an AC should 
have an independent chair, made up of non-executive directors (most of whom are inde-
pendent) and has a minimum of three members (one of whom should have financial exper-
tise). It also recommends that a minimum of four meetings should be held in a year. It also 
contains a recommendation that the board should be made up of only non-executive direc-
tors who have to be trained in special governance programmes to be able to provide greater 
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protections for minority shareholders. The revised code emphasises the importance of the 
AC in overseeing and controlling the process of financial reporting and external auditing. 
The revised code also prevents AC chair from serving on different committees within a 
company (CMA 2015).
In Oman, the immaturity of legal system in terms of protecting the wealth of minor-
ity shareholders, and high level of ownership concentration contribute to weak CG effec-
tiveness (Young et al. 2008; Hashim and Amrah 2016). Therefore, many agency conflicts 
found among majority and minority shareholders (Dry 2003; Hashim and Amrah 2016), 
thus weakening the Omani CG system (see for example CMA 2002 and revised CMA 
2015). This leads to additional focus on mechanisms for internal and external monitoring, 
and stresses the importance of the AC in its oversight and control of financial reporting and 
external auditing processes, while also safeguarding the interests of minority shareholders. 
Thus, this study uses a comprehensive set of AC characteristics to examine their impact on 
FLD quality and quantity.
3  Literature review and hypotheses development
We review relevant literature and develop our research hypotheses on the effect of AC inde-
pendence, meetings, size, financial expertise, AC female members, multiple directorships 
and AC foreign membership on FLD quality and quantity reflecting on agency, resource-
dependence and social capital perspectives.
3.1  Literature review
The literature has examined the impact of AC characteristics (such as independence, the 
frequency of meetings and specialist knowledge) on different financial reporting meas-
ures such as fraud, current and abnormal accruals and audit fees (e.g. DeZoort et al. 2002; 
DeFond and Francis 2005; Yang and Krishnan 2005; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2007; 
Pomeroy and Thornton 2008; Bedard and Gendron 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2010; Cohen et al. 
2014; Sultana et  al. 2015, 2019, 2020; Abdou et  al, 2020). Limited studies examine the 
impact of AC characteristics on FLD in developed countries (Abad and Bravo 2018; Bravo 
and Alcaide-Ruiz 2019). They find that AC characteristics play a role in enhancing FLD.
There is a number of studies that examine FLD in developing countries (Aljifri and 
Hussainey 2007; Aljifri et al. 2013; Alqatamin et al. 2017; Elgammal et al. 2018; Mousa 
and Elamir 2018; Al Lawati and Hussainey 2020). They find that some company character-
istics (such as, company size, leverage and profitability) affect the level of FLD. Al Lawati 
and Hussainey (2020) examine the impact of some characteristics of AC on the level of 
FLD quantity in Omani banks. They find that overlapping AC membership positively 
affects FLD quantity. None of these studies, however, differentiate between FLD quality 
and quantity nor examine the impact of a comprehensive set of AC characteristics on FLD.
The literature uses disclosure quantity as a proxy for disclosure quality (e.g. Hussainey 
et  al. 2003; Hussainey and Walker 2009). Limited evidence shows that quantity is not a 
good proxy for quality and each measure has its own determinants (Elzahar et  al. 2015 
in their study on Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) disclosure and Alotaibi and Hus-
sainey 2016 in their study on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure). Beattie 
et  al. (2004) and Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) state that disclosure quality gives a more 
realistic picture of disclosure than quantity, and helps annual report users making rational 
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decisions. They confirm that the dimensions considered in the disclosure quality frame-
work give more realistic picture of disclosure than quantity, and suggest that, in assessing 
the disclosure, these dimensions could be used to complement each other.
Therefore, our study differs from prior studies by investigating the impact of a compre-
hensive set of AC characteristics on FLD quality and quantity. We also contribute to FLD 
literature by examining whether FLD quantity is a good proxy for FLD quality.
3.2  Hypotheses development
We use agency, resource-dependence and social capital theories to explain the effect of 
AC characteristics on FLD quality and quantity. Based on agency theory, AC plays crucial 
role in reducing the conflict of interest and information asymmetry between management 
and investors (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Along with agency theory, resource-depend-
ence theory is also used to justify the economic significance of AC composition (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 2003), which explains the development of competition-related resources, 
as AC members are able to bring resources to companies through human capital (experi-
ence, expertise, knowledge and reputation) and relational capital (network of ties) (Hill-
man and Dalziel 2003). By using these resources to convey information about strong CG 
and reliable corporate disclosure to the market, they could reduce the information asym-
metry between managers and stakeholders (Mitra et al. 2019). We also use social capital 
theory to explain how AC directors’ social network internally and externally could bridge 
the board to new resources for advice and counsel, legitimacy, channels for communication 
and access to important external markets, thus making a strong argument to be included 
as a rationale for board diversity (Booth-Bell 2018). These resources are vital to simplify 
and improve the accomplishment of ACs’ responsibilities in overseeing financial reporting 
quality (FRQ) (Abdelbadie and Salama 2019).
3.2.1  AC independence and FLD
From the agency theory’s perspective, the primary role of AC is to oversee the firm’s FRQ 
process. It enhances the BODs (principal)’s capacity to act as a monitor of management 
(agent) by providing more insights into the company’s financial reports (Abbott et  al. 
2004). The AC is also expected to play a mediator role between management and exter-
nal auditors since these two parties may have legitimate differences of opinion in how to 
best apply accounting standards (Klein 2002). In addition, from the perspective of resource 
dependence theory, Buallay and Al-Ajmi (2019) state that independent AC members 
make an effort to improve the strategic decisions conducted by BODs by bringing unique 
resources and competences, to provide continuity, and to assist in identifying alliances and 
achievements. Therefore, the existence of independent AC members may help ACs to bal-
ance divergent views of management and external auditors to produce ultimately higher 
FRQ (Sultana et al. 2015; Kusnadi et al. 2016; Saona et al. 2020).
Prior research has consistently found that the effectiveness of the AC is linked to its 
independence (Hoitash and Hoitash 2009). A positive impact of AC independence on FRQ 
(using different proxies, such as lower earnings management, internal control quality, audi-
tor independence and quality) is found (Klein 2002; Carcello and Neal 2003; Krishnan 
2005; Raghunandan and Rama 2007). In line with this, Haji (2015) and Buallay and Al-
Ajmi (2019) find a positive impact of AC independence on disclosure quantity, while 
Salem et al. (2019) and Raimo et al. (2020) find a positive impact on disclosure quality. 
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Other stream of studies finds an insignificant relationship between AC independence and 
voluntary disclosure quantity, such as Li et al. (2012), Al-Maghzom et al. (2016) and Abad 
and Bravo (2018).
Empirical research suggests that AC independence positively affect FRQ. Some devel-
oped countries, such as the US and UK, require all AC members to be independent (Kus-
nadi et al. 2016). Oman and many other countries, such as Australia, China and Singapore, 
only require the majority of AC members to be independent. Omani CG code requires 
firms to appoint an AC of at least three members who must be non-executive and the 
majority (including the chair) should be independent1 (CMA 2015).
In summary, and based on the above arguments, the results are mixed, and whether AC 
independence in Oman will be positively related to FRQ or not is still an empirical ques-
tion. Based on agency and resource dependence theories and the empirical literature, our 
first hypothesis is:
H1: The independence of AC members affects FLD quality and quantity.
3.2.2  AC members with financial expertise and FLD
The literature argues that the financial expertise of AC members has gained the attention 
of regulators around the world in recent years, regarding whether such financial expertise 
makes a difference in improving AC effectiveness in monitoring FRQ (e.g.,Bédard and 
Gendron 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2010; Badolato et al. 2014). Moreover, it is considered as 
one of the most crucial requirements for serving on the AC (Beasley et al. 2009). The 2002 
Omani CG code emphasises financial expertise and recommends that public firms should 
have at least one member with relevant accounting or related financial management exper-
tise or experience. It infers that Oman encourages companies to have mixed expertise.
The primary role of AC, from the agency perspective, is to oversee a company’s finan-
cial processes. This makes it very important that AC members hold financial and account-
ing expertise, to better control management’s financial reporting practices, to produce 
higher FRQ and to develop more rigorous internal control systems and risk-management 
frameworks (Sultana 2015; Sultana and Van der Zahn 2015). According to Raghunandan 
et  al. (2001), from the perspective of social capital theory, ACs with financial expertise 
have greater social network interactions with internal auditors, which reduce internal con-
trol problems (Krishnan 2005), and they are more likely to support external auditors in con-
flict situations with management (DeZoort and Salterio 2001). Findings from these studies 
support the prediction that the presence of AC members with financial expertise improves 
their social capital network and leads to a positive impact on FRQ. Along with agency and 
social capital theories, resource dependence theory also claims that having multiple experi-
enced professionals on the board improves FRQ through knowledge sharing (Pfeffer 1972). 
Hence, Cohen et al. (2008), Hillman et al. (2000), Dhaliwal et al. (2010) and Kusnadi et al. 
(2016) argue that ACs can benefit from different expertise, such as, accounting, financial, 
and supervisory, which complement each other to improve FRQ.
Using different proxies of FRQ (e.g. lower earnings management and auditor quality), 
several studies find a positive impact of AC with financial expertise on FRQ (Bédard et al. 
2004; Badolato et  al. 2014; Sultana et  al. 2015; Bilal et  al. 2018; Ghafran and Yasmin 
1 The Omani code defines independent directors as “not having filled any senior position in the company 
for the last 2 years. In addition, the directors should not have any relations with the company, its parent 
company or its affiliated or sister companies which could result in financial transactions.” (CMA 2015).
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2018; Zalata et al. 2018; Lisic et al. 2019; Bala et al. 2020). In line with this, a positive 
impact of AC financial expertise on disclosure quantity has been found (Haji 2015; Lee 
and Fargher 2018; Abad and Bravo 2018; Enache et al. 2020). This indicates that compa-
nies with financial expertise require less cost to obtain additional information to understand 
the complexity and associated risks of certain financial transactions, and are thus able to 
efficiently monitor senior management and increase FRQ (Zalata et al. 2018).
Even though Albring et al. (2014) find that accounting experts add value to the AC’s 
monitoring of auditor independence, they report ineffectiveness of broader financial exper-
tise. This is in line with two groups of empirical literature. The first group finds a negative 
impact of AC with financial expertise on disclosure quantity (Li et al. 2012; Al-Maghzom 
et  al. 2016; Buallay and Al-Ajmi 2019). The second group (e.g., Wang and Hussainey 
2013; Raimo et  al. 2020; Al Lawati and Hussainey 2020) finds no impact of AC finan-
cial expertise on the level of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, based on these arguments, 
the effectiveness of financial expertise and its impact on disclosure is still an empirical 
question. Therefore, based on agency, resource dependence and social capital theories and 
empirical literature, our second hypothesis is:
H2: The accounting and financial expertise of AC members affects FLD quality and 
quantity.
3.2.3  AC size and FLD
From the perspective of agency theory, AC size is expected to strengthen the effective-
ness of the AC in executing its oversight and monitoring function. Moreover, based on 
resource-dependence theory, the effectiveness of ACs also depends on their access to 
resources, which they need to do their job diligently (e.g. Buallay and Al-Ajmi 2019). 
These resources include having a sufficient number of committee members, and access 
to resources from relevant entities, such as management, auditors, legal counsel, and the 
full board (DeZoort et al. 2002). The literature focuses mainly on AC size as a measure 
of resources. For instance, Allegrini and Greco (2013) state that the resource dependency 
theory argues that a large AC is more eager to dedicate resources and authority to effec-
tively carry out responsibilities. The more directors there are on an AC, the more diversity, 
expertise and capabilities are there that would guarantee operative monitoring (Bédard and 
Gendron 2010). Therefore, a large number of AC members are more likely to aid a com-
mittee to expose and solve issues and dilemmas in corporate reporting processes (Li et al. 
2012). Moreover, Anderson et al. (2004) and Sultana et al. (2015) suggest that a large AC 
provides a greater monitoring function, as it has more members to undertake various moni-
toring tasks, which could enhance FRQ. Furthermore, previous studies find that AC size 
positively affect FRQ (Bédard et al. 2004; Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin 2010) and dis-
closure quantity (Li et al. 2012; Haji 2015; Buallay and Al-Ajmi 2019; Raimo et al. 2020).
In contrast, larger size of the committee may lead to the loss of process and responsibil-
ity diffusion and the emergence of free riders (Klein 2002; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005). 
Wang and Hussainey (2013) and Harun et al. (2020) find that AC size has a negative effect 
on disclosure quantity. These results lend further support to the prediction of the agency 
theory, which assumes that humans act in their self-interest; hence, a larger committee 
size may lead to less coherence between members and hinder the AC’s ability to achieve 
its goals (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Buallay and Al-Ajmi 2019). In addition, Xie et  al. 
(2003), Abbott et al. (2004), Bédard et al. (2004), Al-Maghzom et al. (2016), Salem et al. 
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(2019) and Al Lawati and Hussainey (2020) report that AC size does not affect accruals, 
restatements and voluntary disclosure quantity, respectively.
Based on the above discussion, agency and resource-dependence theories, our third 
hypothesis is:
H3: AC size affects FLD quality and quantity.
3.2.4  AC meeting and FLD
A number of studies use AC meetings frequency as a measure of the diligence of the AC 
in carrying out their responsibilities (Raghunandan and Rama 2007; Bedard and Gendron 
2010). ACs need to meet regularly to ensure that the financial reporting process is function-
ing properly (Vafeas 2005) and to increase the likelihood of discussing and following up 
any financial problems (Gebrayel et al. 2018). Extant evidence on the association between 
AC meetings and monitoring effectiveness is mixed. On the one hand, based on agency 
perspective, some studies find that the number of AC meetings is associated with higher 
FRQ (proxied by different measures, such as auditor selection and auditor quality, fewer 
restatements and less aggressive earnings management) (Abbott and Parker 2000; Xie et al. 
2003; Abbott et  al. 2004; Bédard et  al. 2004; Gebrayel et  al., 2018). In line with this, a 
positive relationship is found between AC meeting frequency and the voluntary disclosure 
level (Li et al. 2012; Allegrini and Greco 2013; Haji 2015; Al-Maghzom et al. 2016; Bual-
lay and Al-Ajmi 2019; Raimo et al. 2020).
On the other hand, other studies find that the number of meetings is associated with 
lower FRQ, for instance more restatements (Sharma and Iselin 2012) and more internal 
control weaknesses (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2007). Some studies also report insignifi-
cant results, including Abbott et al. (2003), Krishnan (2005), Mohamad et al. (2012), and 
Al Lawati and Hussainey (2020). Overall, there is no consensus in the literature regard-
ing the association between AC meetings and FRQ. The mixed evidence in the AC meet-
ings literature is largely the result of AC meeting measurement inconsistency. On the one 
hand, the literature states that more meetings may be associated with higher FRQ if ACs 
are proactively overseeing financial reporting, while on the other hand, it states that more 
meetings may also be a response by the AC to address internal control problems that arise 
during the year. Examples include Abbott and Parker (2000), Abbott et al. (2003), Abbott 
et al. (2004), Krishnan (2005) and Sharma and Iselin (2012).
The Omani code states that the AC shall meet at least four times a year, with a majority 
of independent directors remaining present. Thus, based on agency theory and the earlier 
arguments, our fourth hypothesis is:
H4: The frequency of AC meeting affects FLD quality and quantity.
3.2.5  AC interlock and FLD
AC interlock is defined when AC members hold multiple board seats in other companies. 
This interlock socially channels the flow of information, knowledge, policies, and practices 
between organisation board members (Bloch et al. 2020). There are two theoretical hypoth-
eses that explain the impact of interlock directorships on FRQ (Baatour et al. 2017). Based 
on social capital theory (Abdelbadie and Salama 2019) and information transfer hypothesis 
(Dharwadkar et al. 2020), interlocked AC members brings greater CG experience, valuable 
confidential information and knowledge, including greater skills due to the complexity and 
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magnitude of the operations overseen. This enables them in performing their duties more 
diligently and ask more probing questions to management to ensure FRQ (Sultana et al. 
2019). Interlocked AC members are in a better position to (1) improve communication 
between the AC and both internal and external auditors (Dezoort and Salterio 2001; Sul-
tana et al. 2019); (2) reduce earnings management (e.g. Chee and Tham 2020) and decrease 
auditor dismissals leading to greater AC effectiveness and FRQ (Carcello and Neal 2003; 
Yang and Krishnan 2005); (3) improve firm performance (Ferris et  al. 2003; Harris and 
Shimizu 2004; Trinh et  al. 2020a; Cheng et  al. 2020); (4) improve corporate voluntary 
disclosure (Eulaiwi et al. 2016; Chan et al. 2017; Al Lawati and Hussainey 2020); and (5) 
reduce the cost of equity capital (Sharma et al. 2020).
Moreover, the AC’s relation to the financial reporting process and its network with 
the external auditor make it a potentially important channel for the transfer of account-
ing information (Dharwadkar et al. 2020). They argue that because of their business social 
network, AC is considered an information hub, and AC interlocks are credible channels for 
transmitting accounting information from companies to other companies interlocked with 
them through common AC members. Therefore, they expect that interlocked AC members 
increase the likelihood of accounting information transfer, because their common commit-
tee membership “provides the means, opportunity, and structure that enable members to 
perform their fiduciary and other corporate governance duties” (Peterson and Philpot 2007, 
p. 181). In addition, the literature shows that ensuring the level of resource diversification 
requires a high number of connections between directors and a prominent position in the 
corporate network (Basuil and Datta 2017; Popli et al. 2017).
A positive relationship is found between interlocked AC directors and FRQ (proxied by 
audit fees) (Sultana et al. 2019). Li and Ang (2000) show that these directors are in greater 
demand on the market due to their experience and expertise gathered from outside boards’ 
seats. Similarly, Elnahass et  al. (2020) find that interlocked directors are valued by the 
stock market and investors perceive some reputational benefits arising from an interlocked 
board (e.g. extended industry knowledge, established external networks or facilitation of 
external market sources). Therefore, this reputational benefit will lead these members to 
improve the quality of long-term decision making, which could positively affect the dis-
closures (Muravyev et al. 2016; Chou and Feng 2019). In the same vein, Gebrayel et al. 
(2018) and Bloch et al. (2020) find that better CG practices and efficient FRQ operations 
are seen in interlocked organisations. Al Lawati and Hussainey (2020) find that interlocked 
AC members are positively enhancing the quantity level of FLD.
However, in light of a number of high-profile corporate scandals, busyness hypothesis 
posits that interlocked directors are unable to diligently monitor management due to their 
overloaded responsibilities (Sultana et  al. 2019). Several studies such as, Carpenter and 
Westphal (2001), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Tanyi and Smith (2015) argue that since 
interlock directors being busy and stretched, such directors may provide less effective 
monitoring of management. In addition, Trinh et al. (2020b) find that interlocked directors 
encounter with difficulties in resuming their monitoring roles diligently due to the limited 
time available from serving on several boards. This could create more conflicts of interests 
between shareholders and managers and viewed negatively by the stock market and inves-
tors in particular. In addition, Sarkar et al. (2008) suggest that non-interlock-directorships 
serve as an important CG mechanism that could assist in overcoming the problem of earn-
ings management. Moreover, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) and Tanyi and Smith (2015) show that 
interlocked ACs are less effective in constraining earnings management, which lead to 
lower FRQ.
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However, Al-Absy et  al. (2019) find that interlock directorships do not affect FRQ 
(measured by earnings management). Badhabi and Ismail (2017) conclude that interlocked 
AC members may not be able to control the management effectively and hence FRQ may 
be negatively affected, as busy members’ ability to attend the required meetings diligently 
could be constrained (Ferris et al. 2003; Jiraporn et al. 2009).
The new Omani CG code expects greater oversight responsibility from AC members 
regarding internal and external audit matters. The Omani code suggests that, the maximum 
number of directorial positions for a member of the BODs in a firm is four.
There is, therefore, a natural research tension in the literature given that multiple direc-
torships have been found to be both beneficial and detrimental to governance quality in 
firms. Therefore, based on agency, social capital and resource dependence theories and on 
empirical literature, our fifth hypothesis is:
H5: AC members with multiple directorships affect FLD quality and quantity.
3.2.6  AC female membership and FLD
There are multiple mechanisms through which female directors are able to positively affect 
the monitoring responsibility and thereby improve FRQ. From an agency perspective, 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that female presence on an AC is likely to improve 
monitoring as they are not part of the ‘old-boys’ club’, which puts them closer to independ-
ent directors (Zalata et al. 2018). For instance, the appointment of female directors enables 
more informed decisions, enhances the decision-making process, and improves commu-
nication among board members (Bear et al. 2010). Moreover, they enhance the depth and 
breadth of discussion and deliberations, particularly those related to challenging issues of 
FRQ process (Srinidhi et al. 2011). Consistent with the resource dependence theory, AC 
female members may bring strategic resources to the ACs on which they serve (Campbell 
and Mínguez-Vera 2008), which may lead to generating new ideas and increasing ethical 
sensitivity and, as a result, improving voluntary disclosure practices (Tejedo-Romero et al. 
2017). Also, scholars have suggested, based on resource-dependence theory, that gender 
diversity facilitates effective monitoring by broadening valuable resources such as exper-
tise, experience, interests, perspectives and creativity (Erhardt et  al. 2003; Hoever et  al. 
2012). Moreover, this effective monitoring would reduce the information asymmetry at 
the board level and encourage more public disclosure by limiting managers’ use of insider 
information for their own benefit (Gul et al. 2011; Srinidhi et al. 2011) which would subse-
quently increase FRQ.
The literature finds that companies with female directors perceived as ethical which in 
turn leads to increased FRQ (Cohen et  al. 1998; Zalata et  al. 2018). This suggests that 
female directors may be unlikely to tolerate policies depicting opportunistic stance (Srini-
dhi et al. 2011; Zalata et al. 2018), which corroborates with the argument that women have 
different values at work and thereby affect decisions in organisations (Crow et al. 1991). As 
a result, female directors are unlikely to be involved in practices that involve collusion with 
the management to manipulate financial reports for personal benefit and are more likely to 
disclose fraudulent financial reporting practices, as the compassionate nature of females 
may mean considering the interests of shareholders over self-centric interests, ultimately 
resulting in effective monitoring of FRQ (Kaplan et al. 2009).
Moreover, many previous studies find that companies with female directors are more 
likely to increase FRQ (proxied by different measures, such as less earnings management 
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and higher audit quality) (Zalata et al. 2018; Gull et al. 2018; Bala et al. 2020; Chee and 
Tham 2020; Saona et al. 2020; Sultana et al. 2020). In addition, Allini et al. (2016), Al-
Yahyaee et al. (2017), and Aribi et al. (2018) find that the presence of women on a board 
makes a significant difference to the quantity of risk disclosure, which improves the effec-
tiveness of the board and enhance accountability and transparency.
Extant research also supports the idea that companies with female board members out-
perform their rivals. For instance, Gul et al. (2011) find that female directors are associ-
ated with richer information environment and similarly, Gul et al. (2013) show that gender 
diversity adds to the transparency and accuracy of financial reports. Recently, Bravo and 
Alcaide-Ruiz (2019) and Bravo and Reguera-Alvarado (2019) find a positive association 
between gender diversity on the AC and the corporate voluntary disclosure.
Based on agency and resource dependence theories and consistent with the findings 
above, our sixth hypothesis is:
H6: AC Female directors have a positive impact on FLD quality and quantity.
3.2.7  AC foreign membership and FLD
From the resource-dependence perspective, foreign directors bring with them invaluable 
knowledge concerning contextual issues in foreign markets and hence they contribute to 
the strategic decision-making quality (Zahra and Filatotchev 2004). They are also less 
likely to be associated with companies and their management and are therefore consid-
ered to be independent (Van der Walt and Ingley 2003). Furthermore, foreign directors 
may bring much needed expertise and diversity, especially for companies that operate glob-
ally (Al-Matari et al. 2014). Including foreign members on the boards would enhance the 
monitoring of management and induce them to act in the best interest of companies’ cur-
rent owners by disclosing high quality information to shareholders (Grassa et al. 2020). By 
doing so, they will show the managers their loyalty to the company they serve on which 
could help them in securing their position in the company. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
Barako et al. (2006) and Grassa et al. (2020) find that foreign board members have a posi-
tive impact on disclosure quantity.
On the contrary, foreign directors are inherently costly -they may come from a differ-
ent culture, speak a different language, be physically distant from the companies on whose 
boards they serve and may demand a higher level of compensation for the inconvenience of 
serving on the boards outside their own country of residence (Al-Matari et al. 2014). This 
could lead them to damage FRQ due to not fully concentrating on the process of financial 
reporting and not being aware of the country context. Cao et al. (2019) find that the nega-
tive role of foreign directors in the strategic decision-making process is due at least in part 
to the cultural differences between board directors, especially in transactions with a high 
degree of uncertainty. They confirm the argument that national cultural diversity hinders 
communication and collaboration within boards. In the same vein, Firoozi et al. (2016) find 
that companies with AC foreign members have lower FRQ. This has been explained by the 
small number of foreign directors on AC, which gives them a minimal effect on monitoring 
the FRQ process.
Although the importance of this variable is clear, there is a lack of previous stud-
ies examining this relationship, and especially foreign members on ACs. We believe we 
can add empirical knowledge by examining this characteristic in ACs, which has not yet 
been studied from this perspective, and we expect an effect on the quality and quantity of 
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voluntary disclosure. Based on the above arguments and agency, resource dependence and 
social capital theories, our seventh hypothesis is:
H7: Foreign members serving on AC affect FLD quality and quantity.
4  Research design and methods
4.1  Data collection and sample selection
We draw our sample from the population of Omani financial companies listed on MSM 
between the 2014 and 2018. Oman’s financial sector consists, mainly, of conventional 
and Islamic banks, finance and leasing companies, investment/brokerage companies, 
insurance companies and real estate (MSM 2019). Data concerned AC characteristics 
and country-specific variables are hand-collected from annual reports. Moreover, cor-
porate performance data are obtained from Bloomberg. Furthermore, a manual content 
analysis of chairmen’s statement is applied to measure FLD quality and quantity.
We choose 2014–2018 to analyse the effect of the regulatory changes following the 
updated code of CG in Oman, as it has been inaugurated in 2016. We argue that the 
newly mandated AC function would encourage more disclosure to avert the attention 
of the public. The population of the study is consisted of 180 company-year observa-
tions over the period, as shown in Table  1. Financial sector has been selected due to 
its unique nature. It is the largest sector in Oman, indicated by market capitalisation 
(MSM 2019), and is heavily regulated by two bodies, namely the CMA and the Central 
Bank of Oman (CBO), resulting in more disclosure to please different stakeholders and 
attract new investments (Al-Hadi et al. 2016). Moreover, the financial sector is consid-
ered to be the backbone of the whole economy in general and the non-financial sector 
in particular; therefore, it links directly to Oman’s Vision 2040 (2019). For instance, the 
financial sector in Oman is dominated by commercial banks, which account for more 
than 90% of the financial sector’s total assets and liabilities (CBO 2018).
Annual reports are considered to be legal and official documents and are regulated by 
the CMA and published on the MSM website (CMA 2015). Moreover, annual reports 
are mandatory documents, which all listed companies must prepare, and Al-Hadi et al. 
(2016) suggest that the accounting information provided in these reports is the only reli-
able source of information available to users in GCC capital markets.









Total observations for the study sample 36 × 5 
(years) = 180
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We follow Hussainey and Walker’s (2009) method, focusing on annual report nar-
ratives, because they contain more voluntary FLD than other sections of the annual 
report. Moreover, the narrative sections are considered to be mandatory in Oman, but 
the content reported in the chairman’s statement and MD&A comprise voluntary textual 
narrative disclosure. As a result, our paper obtains FLD scores by analysing the chair-
man’s statement. The Chairman’s statement contains an important information asso-
ciated with the companies’ future position (Smith and Taffler 2000). Additionally, as 
Abrahamson and Amir (1996) note, the issues addressed in the chairman’s statement, 
which is more readable, are of broader strategic nature, and are different in a qualita-
tive sense to the MD&A, which is more regulated. Furthermore, Bartlett and Chandler 
(1997) and Clatworthy and Jones (2006) provide evidence that the chairman’s statement 
usually has greater information content to stakeholders, and specifically to investment 
analysts, which help them in making investment decisions.
4.2  Variables: measurement and description
4.2.1  Dependent variable: FLD variable
FLD involves both quantity and quality information. First, FLD quantity is measured 
by counting the number of sentences related to the future (Hassanein and Hussainey 
2015; Al Lawati and Hussainey 2020). Sentences are commonly considered as the 
unit of analysis in disclosure studies, because they are more reliable coding units than 
words: words cannot be interpreted and coded without the context of a sentence (Milne 
and Adler 1999; Hassanein et  al. 2019). We test the reliability and validity of our 
measure through both reproducibility and stability tests (Krippendorff 2013), and no 
mistakes or errors were found. We also test for internal consistency using Cronbach’s 
Alpha. We find that Cronbach’s Alpha percentage is 92 which is considered high com-
pared to the acceptable percentage in disclosure studies (e.g. 91.3%) (Al Lawati and 
Hussainey 2020).
Second, to measure FLD quality, following Beattie et al.’s (2004) method, a com-
prehensive four-dimensional quality framework (financial/non-financial, good/bad 
news, quantitative/qualitative and long/short term orientations) is used. We illustrate 
the measurement of each dimension of the quality framework that is used to measure 
FLD quality. First, we measure the non-financial attribute by dividing the number of 
non-financial sentences in each chairman’s statement by the total number of forward-
looking sentences in that report (FinQuality). Second, we measure the tone dimension 
by taking the proportion of all good forward-looking sentences within the chairman’s 
statement (Tone). Third, the time dimension is counted by scaling the long-term for-
ward-looking sentences over the total amount of forward-looking sentences within the 
chairman’s statement (TimeQuality). The fourth dimension is measured through the 
proportion of qualitative forward-looking sentences within each chairman’s statement 
(QLYOrientation). Finally, we measure the FLD quality by averaging the four scores of 
the quality dimensions (Quality FLD).
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4.2.2  Independent variables
Our seven main variables of interest are defined following Hoitash and Hoitash (2009), 
Kusnadi et  al. (2016) and Al Lawati and Hussainey (2020). First, the size of AC 
(ACSize) which refers to the number of directors on the AC of firm i in time period t; 
second, is the diligence of AC (ACMeet) and refers to the number of AC meetings held 
for firm i in time period t; third, multiple directorships of AC members are denoted 
(ACMul) and measured as the percentage of AC members serving on multiple boards 
for firm i in time period t. Fourth, independent of AC members (ACInd) and refers 
to the proportion of independent AC directors for firm i in time period t; fifth, is the 
proportions of females on the AC (ACFem); sixth, the percentage of AC foreign direc-
torship (ACFor). Lastly, the percentage of AC members with financial and accounting 
expertise (ACFin) is measured as those who are certified public accountants (CPAs) or 
have prior work experience as a chief financial officer (CFO), vice president of finance, 
financial controller, investment banker, chief investment officer, financial analyst, audi-
tor, or any other corporate finance or major accounting position.
4.2.3  Control variables
We include a set of control variables to increase the predictive ability of the model and mini-
mise the effect of omitted variables (Lopes and de Alencar 2010). The additional country-
specific and company characteristics used as control variables are from the extant research. 
We control for auditor quality by incorporating a variable for the presence of an external Big 
4 audit firm (Big4) following Al-Shammari et al. (2008), Al-Hadi et al. (2016) who find that 
compliance with accounting standards in GCC countries is driven by auditor quality. Based on 
meta-analyses of disclosure studies and prior literature on FLD (Aljifri and Hussainey 2007; 
Al-Najjar and Abed 2014; Khlif and Hussainey 2016; Kılıç and Kuzey 2018; Al Lawati and 
Hussainey 2020), several control variables are considered to be related to the disclosure of 
this information: company size, leverage and profitability. Company size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets (LogAsset); the ratio of total debt to total assets has been used 
to measure companies’ leverage (LEVTDTA) and ROE is used to measure profitability (Aljifri 
and Hussainey 2007; Abed et al, 2014; Al Lawati and Hussainey 2020).
Furthermore, we control for other country-specific characteristics that relate to the GCC, 
which includes Oman. Following Al-Hadi et al. (2016) and Salem et al. (2019), we control 
for the presence of family directors (Relatives) on the board, measured as a dummy variable 
equal to one if a company has directors from the same family on the board and zero otherwise. 
Moreover, following Al-Hadi et al. (2016) and Dicko et al. (2020), ruling family membership 
(Royal) is controlled and set to equal to one if a company has at least one ruling director on 
the board and zero otherwise. These members have an influential power on the boards as they 
have a direct access to various information and to multiple resources due to their connected-
ness, thus will help in disclosing relevant information in order to aligning the interests of both 
shareholders and managers and reducing agency costs (Salem et al. 2019; Dicko et al. 2020).
Finally, FLD could be influenced by general disclosure practices within specific industries 
and over years (Wang and Hussainey 2013; Kılıç and Kuzey, 2018). Industry and year dum-
mies are created.
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5  Research model
We use multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression following prior studies (e.g. Abad 
and Bravo 2018; Kılıç and Kuzey 2018; Bravo and Alcaide-Ruiz 2019; Raimo et al. 2020; Al 
Lawati and Hussainey 2020) after ensuring that all the necessary assumptions for OLS have 
been met. The two models are as follows:
(Refer to Sect. 4.2 for variables definitions).
(1)
  ∶ Quantity FLD = β0 + β1 ACMeet + β2 ACSize + β3 ACInd
+ β4 ACFem + β5 ACMul + β6 ACFor + β7 ACFin
+ β8 Big4 + β9 Total Asset + β10 LEV + β11 ROE
+ β12 Relatives + β13 Royal + Year Dummies
+ Industry Dummies + 
(2)
  ∶ Quality FLD = β0 + β1 ACMeet + β2 ACSize + β3 ACInd
+ β4 ACFem + β5 ACMul + β6 ACFor + β7 ACFin
+ β8 Big4 + β9 Total Asset + β10 LEV + β11 ROE
+ β12 Relatives + β13 Royal + Year Dummies
+ Industry Dummies + 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics
Variable definitions—see Sect. 4.2
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Quality FLD 0.71 0.15 0.00 1.00
Quantity FLD 13.26 8.45 0.00 40.00
FinQaulity 0.51 0.26 0.00 1.00
Tone 0.86 0.18 0.00 1.00
TimeQuality 0.65 0.25 0.00 1.00
QLYOrientation 0.80 0.19 0.00 1.00
ACMeet 4.77 1.56 0.00 12.00
ACSize 3.39 0.59 2.00 6.00
ACInd(%) 0.78 0.20 0.00 1.00
ACFem(%) 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.33
ACMul(%) 0.56 0.32 0.00 1.00
ACFor(%) 0.32 0.31 0.00 1.00
ACFin(%) 0.73 0.28 0.00 1.00
Big 4 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00
TotalAsset (m) 852.86 2,053.89 0.40 12,544.50
ROE% 3.26 29.00  − 251.20 37.41
LEV (TD/TA) 16.34 21.72 0.00 69.58
Relatives 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Royal 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
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6  Empirical results
6.1  Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents our descriptive statistics. The analysis shows a significant variation in the 
FLD. On average, Omani financial companies release about 13 sentences of forward-look-
ing information in their chairman’ statement annually. The maximum number of FLD sen-
tences is 40, with a minimum of 0. The results show how Omani financial institutions are 
encouraged to disclose FLD in their chairman’s statement. The result is similar to what has 
been found in Al Lawati and Hussainey (2020).
The overall result of the current study shows that the mean of FLD quality is 71%, with 
a minimum value of 0 and maximum of 100%. According to the attributes of FLD qual-
ity, we find that the chairman’s statement in Oman is dominated by non-financial, good, 
long-term and qualitative FLD, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Mousa and 
Elamir 2018; Al Lawati and Hussainey 2020), with an average of 51%, 86%, 65% and 80% 
respectively for each of the FLD quality dimension as follow: FinQaulity, Tone, TimeQual-
ity and QLYOrientation. This indicates that Omani financial companies are moving for-
ward towards disclosing high quality relevant information to help the shareholders in mak-
ing appropriate decisions.
In terms of AC characteristics, we observe that on average, the proportion of finan-
cial and accounting expertise directors on ACs is 73%. In addition, the average values for 
ACFor, ACMul and ACFem are 32%, 56% and 2%, respectively. Interestingly, the ACs are 
highly independent, scoring an average of 78%, with some committees are totally inde-
pendent, while others are not. Moreover, the average size of AC is 4 members, with up to a 
maximum of 6 members and a minimum of just 2 members. Furthermore, in relation to AC 
meetings frequency, there are on average of 5 AC meetings annually, with up to a maxi-
mum of 12 and surprisingly with a minimum of 0.
In terms of audit quality, almost 90% of the study sample are audited by one of the Big 
4 audit firms. According to the sample classification between family and royal companies, 
almost half of the sample have relative members on the board and on average, 16% of our 
sampled companies have royal directors.
6.2  Correlation analysis
Table 3 shows that there is no correlation between the quantity and quality measures of 
FLD, which confirms the results of the previous study conducted by Alotaibi and Hus-
sainey (2016), who provide empirical evidence that disclosure quantity is not a proper 
proxy for disclosure quality. Moreover, we find a positive correlation between FLD quan-
tity and AC meeting, auditor quality, company size, profitability, leverage and ruling mem-
bers on the board. In addition, a negative association has been found between FLD quantity 
and relative members on the boards.
Moving to FLD quality, the results show a positive correlation between this variable and 
company size, profitability and ruling members on the board, while a negative correlation 
has been found between FLD quality and relative members on the board.
In addition, the correlation among all variables is below 0.8, suggesting that multicol-
linearity is not a problem (Gujarati and Porter 2009). This is confirmed by the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) as all variables have VIF less than 10 (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013).
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6.3  Regression analysis
Table 4 reports the regression analysis. Model (1) examines the impact of the independent 
variables on the FLD quantity (Quantity FLD), while, Model (2) studies the influence on 
the FLD quality (Quality FLD). Both models are significant, with Prob > F values less than 
0.01, indicating their validity.
6.3.1  AC independence
AC independence (ACInd) is shown to have a significant negative relationship with FLD 
quality at the 0.1 level, however, no association has been found with FLD quantity. We 
partially accept H1. The results are contradicting agency theory; however, they are in line 
with the findings of Li et al. (2012), Al-Maghzom et al. (2016) and Abad and Bravo (2018) 
who report an insignificant association with disclosure practices. According to Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002), a possible explanation for this result is that independent directors lack 
business knowledge to make certain effective actions. In terms of the disclosure process, 
independent directors may also prevent managers from disclosing verifiable information 
to prevent the risk of facing a greater accountability and reputation costs (Ajinkya et al. 
2005). Therefore, independent directors can have incentives to withhold FLD to minimise 
Table 4  Multiple regression 
analysis
* Coefficient is significant at 10%
** Coefficient is significant at 5%
*** Coefficient is significant at 1%
Variable definitions—see Sect. 4.2
Variables Quantity FLD Quality FLD
Model 1 Model 2
ACMeet 0.176  − 0.019***
ACSize 0.989 0.027*
ACInd 0.774  − 0.089*
ACFem 7.246 0.218*
ACMul 0.508 0.092***
ACFor  − 3.472* 0.033
ACFin  − 3.643*  − 0.091***




Relatives  − 3.493***  − 0.057***
Royal 1.911 0.075***
_cons 4.235 0.846
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Years dummies Yes Yes
No. of obs 180 180
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.278 0.282
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these costs, as it is verifiable ex-post. Other possible justification could be that long-ten-
ured independent directors may become closer to managers and, therefore, their monitor-
ing role can be compromised (Vafeas 2003). This could be the case in the Omani context, 
companies try to hold the same independent members for many years, which could impair 
their monitoring role by becoming closer to management team. Moreover, in Oman, the 
independence of directors can be in form but not substantive. It is noted that a large ratio of 
independent members in listed companies are the main shareholders or executive directors 
of large shareholders (Al-Hadi et  al. 2016). Additionally, the existence of relatives from 
second level and above as independent members is found in the top management of many 
companies. These cases may impede the role of independent directors in AC in monitor-
ing and overseeing the processes of financial reporting and internal controls (Raweh et al. 
2019).
6.3.2  AC with financial expertise
The study finds that AC members with financial expertise (ACFin) negatively affect FLD 
quality (at a significant level of 0.01) and quantity (at a significant level of 0.1). H2 has 
been accepted. The results are consistent with Li et al. (2012) and Carrera et al. (2017), 
who find the same effect on FRQ and Al-Maghzom et al. (2016) and Buallay and Al-Ajmi 
(2019) on the level of disclosure. However, the findings contradict the agency theory 
as well as Haji (2015), Abad and Bravo (2018) and Enache et  al. (2020). This could be 
explained by the possibility that these crucial directors prevent managers from disclos-
ing verifiable information to avoid the risk of high legitimacy and public pressure costs 
(Ajinkya et al. 2005). Further Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) suggest that this could be 
attributed to the connectedness of AC financial experts to the CEOs, which has an adverse 
effect on oversight quality, which is consistent with negative side of the social capital the-
ory. Moreover, because of the Omani ACs are mostly made up of non-accounting financial 
experts, this might reduce the power of AC financial experts to influence FLD.
6.3.3  AC size
The analysis shows that there is a positive and significant impact of AC size (ACSize) on 
FLD quality at the 0.1 level, however, no impact has been found on the FLD quantity. The 
result partially accepts H3. The findings are also consistent with resource-dependence the-
ory and with prior literature (Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin 2010; Li et  al. 2012; Haji 
2015; Buallay and Al-Ajmi 2019; Raimo et al. 2020). That could be explained that large 
groups are able to share different knowledge and expertise about the potential benefits of 
releasing information towards values of a company (Allegrini and Greco 2013). In addi-
tion, large groups of ACs in Oman tend to be resourceful and are able to cover individual 
weaknesses, thus resulting in an enhanced monitoring role especially after considering the 
AC in Oman as the “keystones” of corporate financial governance following the occur-
rence of fraudulent financial reporting in recent years (CMA 2015).
6.3.4  AC meetings
We find that the frequency of AC meetings (ACMeet) is negatively influencing in deter-
mining the quality of FLD at a significant level of 0.01. However, it is shown to have 
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insignificant association with FLD quantity. The results partially support H4. The results 
contradict the agency theory and observations by Li et al. (2012), Haji (2015) and Buallay 
and Al-Ajmi (2019). The results, however, are in line with Mohamad et al. (2012).
A reasonable explanation suggested by Baatwah et  al. (2015) is that AC members in 
Oman may be overcommitted by solving directors’ conflicts during meetings, such as 
related party transactions, and therefore commit less time to addressing their main roles 
related to FRQ, and external auditor reports. These members are thus less motivated to 
monitor, discuss and disclose relevant information to stakeholders. This would lead regula-
tors to increasingly monitor the way these meetings are conducting in Oman, and there will 
be more encouragement from regulators to emphasise more voluntary information disclo-
sures. This will help shareholders to obtain the benefit of information circulated at these 
meetings.
6.3.5  AC multiple directorship
Our analysis shows that ACs with multiple directorships (ACMul) positively affect FLD 
quality at a significant level of 0.01, however, no impact has been found on FLD quan-
tity. Hence, we partially accept H5. The result suggests that these members can assist the 
board in taking the right decision on disclosing high level of FLD, which will be useful to 
investors in making informed investments decisions (Eulaiwi et al. 2016). Based on social 
capital theory and resource-dependence theory, which argue that due to the business con-
nections, AC members could gain valuable experience (including governance experience) 
from serving on other boards, which provides them with the skills and motivations to seek 
greater assurances in the area of FRQ (Sultana et al. 2019). The results are in line with the 
agency and resource-dependence arguments as well as Yang and Krishnan (2005), Eulaiwi 
et  al. (2016), Gebrayel et  al. (2018) and Al Lawati and Hussainey (2020). Furthermore, 
Abdelbadie and Salama (2019), Trinh et al. (2020a) and Elnahass et al. (2020) provide evi-
dence that interlocked directors are very beneficial to companies in terms of the extended 
knowledge, wider channel networks and broader experience that these members gain from 
serving on different companies. They also state that these members perceived valuable by 
the stock markets and investors due to the reputational benefit they have.
The results have implications for nomination committees in Omani financial companies, 
suggesting that they need to appoint more of these members to ACs due to their positive 
effect on financial reporting, which can encourage foreign investment and restore confi-
dence in the market through beneficial decisions.
6.3.6  AC female members
A positive impact has been found of AC female members (ACFem) on the FLD quality 
at a significant level of 0.1. However, no influence has been found on FLD quantity. H6 is 
accepted partially. The result is consistent with agency theory and with previous studies 
(Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki 2017; Gull et al. 2018; Aribi et al. 2018; Bravo and Alcaide-
Ruiz 2019). This could be because females have different capabilities than males due to the 
different socialisation processes for men and women (Srinidhi et al. 2011). Furthermore, 
female directors may often have to demonstrate remarkable skills to gain managerial posi-
tions and corporate-board membership (Bala et al. 2020). Moreover, women are found to 
be more ethical in their professional life and less likely to engage in immoral activities to 
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gain monetary benefits than men (Kaplan et al. 2009), and hence improve FRQ. The con-
tribution made by Omani women to economy and society has increased in recent years, 
which is reflected in the fact that the number of working women has been doubled and 
tripled in the public and private sectors respectively according to the National Centre for 
Statistics and Information (Bureau 2015). Bureau (2015) also mentions that Omani women 
hold an increasing number of top government and business positions.
6.3.7  AC foreign members
Our analysis shows that AC foreign (ACFor) members negatively affect FLD quantity at a 
significant level of 0.1, however, no impact has been found on FLD quality. Hence, we par-
tially accept H7. This could be because these members come from different settings, and 
thus might not be fully aware of the Omani system. Moreover, the time and energy spent 
on cross-border travels are likely to place excessive burden on foreign directors, potentially 
undermining their incentives and ability to effectively monitor senior management, hence, 
reducing FRQ (Masulis et al. 2007). In addition, Firoozi et al. (2016) state that because of 
few numbers of foreign members serving on AC compared to the local directors, the for-
mer directors will have a slight influence in encouraging the boards to disclose high level 
of voluntary information. Board nomination committees should carefully consider the cost 
and benefit of hiring foreign members to achieve the best possible outcomes for sharehold-
ers by aligning the interests of BODs with shareholders’ interests, and ensuring the disclo-
sure of all relevant information required for making beneficial decisions.
6.3.8  Control variables
Our analysis shows that company size (LogAsset), profitability (ROE) and leverage ratio 
(LEVTDTA) are shown to be positive and significant at the confidence level of 99% in 
relation to FLD practice, suggesting that large, profitable, and highly geared companies 
release more FLD. The results are consistent with Liu (2015) and Elgammal et al. (2018).
We also find a positive impact of auditing (Big4) on FLD quantity at a significant level 
of 0.05. This is consistent with Al-Hadi et al. (2016) who find same effect on voluntary 
disclosure. However, a negative influence is found on the quality level of FLD at a signifi-
cant level of 0.01. This could be due to recent international auditors’ high-profile scandals 
in Oman, such as KPMG and Moore Stephen. These international auditors could influence 
companies on withholding FLD to avoid the increase in legitimacy costs resulting from 
their failure in meeting what they have promised.
We also find that family directorship (Relatives) is an impediment to both the quality 
and quantity of FLD, as evidenced by the negative and statistically significant coefficients 
for this variable at the 0.01 level. The results are consistent with those of prior research 
(e.g. Ali et al. 2007; Al-Hadi et al. 2016; Eulaiwi et al. 2016). Moreover, our paper finds 
that companies with ruling family members (Royal) are positively affecting the quality of 
FLD at a significant level of 0.01, which contradicts the results of Al-Hadi et al. (2016). 
Our result is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Dicko et al. 2020). We suggest that royal 
family members provide ACs with specific human capital and complement the knowl-
edge and abilities of the other directors by having insider information, which leads to an 
improvement of disclosure quality by providing more FLD in Oman. To conclude, family 
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and royal members are considered two-edged sword. It is a valuable resource for connected 
companies, but it comes at a cost of higher agency problems (Belghitar et al. 2019).
7  Additional analyses
7.1  Examining the impact of AC share ownership and supervisory expertise on FLD
We use alternative measures for AC independence and AC financial expertise, follow-
ing Habib and Bhuiyan (2018) and Kusnadi et al. (2016), respectively. In the first test, we 
examine the effect of AC share ownership on FLD quality and quantity. The literature finds 
that equity holdings align AC member interests with those of shareholders and provide 
more effective oversight of financial reporting, the same role to what independence does 
(Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Habib and Bhuiyan 2018). In the second test, we examine the 
influence of AC supervisory expertise on FLD quality and quantity. The literature shows 
the need to differentiate AC expertise into several components (e.g. Goh 2009; Kusnadi 
et  al. 2016). Table  5 illustrates our additional analyses. Model (1) examines the impact 
of AC share ownership and AC supervisory expertise on FLD quantity, while Model (2) 
examines the impact of these two variables on FLD quality.
Table 5  The impact of AC share 
ownership and supervisory 
expertise on FLD
* Coefficient is significant at 10%
** Coefficient is significant at 5%
*** Coefficient is significant at 1%
Variable definitions—see Sect. 4.2
Variables Quantity FLD Quality FLD
Model 1 Model 2
ACShr  − 9.228***  − 0.047
ACSup 1.348  − 0.083*
Big4 3.273*  − 0.130***
LogAsset 2.585*** 0.024*
ROE  − 0.005 0.002***
LEVTDTA 0.130*** 0.001
Relatives  − 1.937*  − 0.052**
Royal 1.311 0.060**
_cons 7.255 0.854
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Years dummies Yes Yes
No. of obs 180 180
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.332 0.204
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7.1.1  Impact of AC share ownership on FLD
This additional test answers the call suggested by Malik (2014) and Velte (2017) that AC 
share ownership needs to be examined further with regard to the monitoring process from 
an international perspective. Based on agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) state 
that it is acceptable for directors to possess a percentage value of a company’s shares to 
motive them to align their interest with the interest of other stakeholders and to serve as 
a management monitor on behalf of shareholders. Two arguments are put forward in the 
literature to elucidate the relationship between AC share ownership and financial reporting.
On the one hand, some studies are in favor of increased equity holdings by AC mem-
bers. For instance, MacGregor (2012) finds that AC responsiveness to risk is heightened 
by equity holdings. Beasley et al. (2000) reveal that financial statement fraud is reduced 
by an increase in the level of share ownership by AC members, and FRQ is simultaneously 
improved (Vafeas 2005). Moreover, Bolton (2014) finds that AC shareholding is consid-
ered a vital mechanism in aligning the interests of directors and external shareholders.
However, agency theory discourages to apply the management compensation system 
to the AC due to increased conflicts of interest (Velte 2017). Compensating AC directors 
with equity and shareholding may diminish the objectivity of such AC directors, support 
the managerial opportunism and weaken the monitoring mechanism (Yang and Krishnan 
2005). They find that stock ownership by AC members increases quarterly earnings man-
agement, which leads to lower FRQ. Furthermore, Cullinan, Du and Jiang (2010) reveal 
that there is a greater likelihood that weakness in internal control will be reported by firms 
with a stock option plan for their AC members than firms without. Moreover, Archam-
beault et al. (2008) find that AC incentive-based compensation is positively associated with 
financial restatements. In addition, using the US and New Zealand CG settings, Bédard 
et al. (2004) and Sharma and Kuang (2014) respectively, confirm that higher levels of stock 
ownership by AC directors increase aggressive earnings management behaviour, which 
could reduce FRQ. Recently, Al Lawati and Hussainey (2020) find a negative relationship 
between AC members with share ownership and the quantity level of FLD in Omani banks.
We create a variable (ACShr) which represents the proportion of AC members who hold 
or represent a company’s shares on AC size following Eulaiwi et al. (2016) and Al Lawati 
and Hussainey (2020). A multiple regression analysis has been conducted to examine the 
impact of AC share ownership on the FLD quantity and quality.
We find a negative and significant relationship between AC share ownership (ACShr) 
and the quantity level of FLD (Model 1) at the 0.01 level. This could be because ACs with 
share ownership in Oman may reduce the level of FLD by colluding with management to 
protect their investment, which will lead to a reduction in share price and consequently 
decrease the market value of the company, which will harm all shareholders. In addition, 
Velte (2017) find that the remuneration of AC directors, along with equity compensation, 
may affect the way in which their monitoring tasks are performed, which could harm FRQ.
7.1.2  Impact of AC supervisory expertise on FLD
We also respond to a call by the Omani CMA regulators to diversify board members 
with different and rich experiences. Supervisory expertise is considered as important as 
financial expertise and they are classified as AC members with prior work experience in 
supervisory roles (ACSup) such as chief executive officers (CEO), chief operation officers 
(COO), chairman of a board of directors, or company presidents and or having more than 
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20 years of experience in their field, following Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) and Kusnadi 
et al. (2016).
Resource dependence theory argues that directors extract human capital resources from 
other directors to improve firm performance (Pfeffer 1972). Hence, both Hillman et  al. 
(2000) and Cohen et al. (2008) argue that AC can benefit from a mix of accounting and 
non-accounting expertise, such as finance expertise and supervisory expertise. However, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that supervisory experts, such as CEOs or company presidents, 
are unable to help accounting and finance experts to enhance FRQ, which appears to con-
tradict the findings of Goh (2009), who find that AC members with supervisory expertise 
are positively associated with firms’ timeliness in the remediation of internal control defi-
ciencies, which enhances FRQ. Moreover, Faleye et al. (2018) find board industry (super-
visory) expertise reduces real earnings management and increases FRQ.
A multiple regression analysis has been conducted to examine the impact of AC super-
visory expertise on FLD quantity and quality in the context of Oman. The study finds 
that AC members with supervisory expertise negatively affect FLD quality (Model 2) at 
the 0.1 level. This could be explained by these crucial members preventing reporting for-
ward-looking information by managers in order to avert the risk of greater responsibility 
and litigation costs being faced by companies (Ajinkya et al. 2005). Therefore, they may 
have some incentives to withhold FLD to minimise these costs. In Oman, AC members 
are recruited based on seniority from fairly small circles of elites and which are staffed 
with directors who often have little spare time and despite having wide general experience, 
normally have limited specialised expertise, which could extensively harm FRQ (Al-Hadi 
et al. 2017).
7.2  Checking for endogeneity
We run additional tests to confirm that the results are not affected by endogeneity prob-
lem. There are three causes of endogeneity, namely, correlated omitted variables, structural 
reverse causality and measurement errors (Lopes and de Alencar 2010).
Firstly, omitted variables arise when not all relevant explanatory variables have been 
included because of data unavailability, and this omitted variable is correlated with the 
explanatory variables (Lopes and de Alencar 2010). We conduct a “Ramsey test” to check 
if any variables have been missed from the model. The result confirms the null hypothesis 
which states that the model has no omitted variables. Moreover, we include a set of control 
variables that can potentially solve the possible endogeneity of the specifications (Lopes 
and de Alencar 2010).
Secondly, structural reverse causality refers to the direction of causality between X and 
Y (Lopes and de Alencar 2010). We perform the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test across all 
our test models to examine whether the reverse causality problem exists. The test statistics 
confirm that there is no presence of endogeneity issue.
Thirdly, a measurement error occurs when instead of measuring the constructed depend-
ent variable, a proxy is used which does not represent the underlying variable well (Lopes 
and de Alencar 2010). We have differentiated between the quality and quantity measures of 
FLD, moreover, we use a robust estimation technique (Table 5).
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7.3  Impact of AC effectiveness (ACE) on FLD quantity and quality
In order to ensure that our results are rigorous, we conduct several further tests. Since our 
results show that AC independence, AC size, AC meeting and AC financial expertise have 
a significant impact on FLD quality and/or quantity, we create a new variable which con-
sists of the four referred AC characteristics to composite one variable (AC Effectiveness) 
following Zaman et al. (2011) and Al-Shaer et al. (2017). These authors find that the inter-
actions of these variables are likely to impact more strongly than their individual compo-
nents. AC Effectiveness (ACE) is thus a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when (i) the AC 
membership consists of all independent non-executive directors, (ii) at least one member of 
the AC has financial expertise, (iii) AC members meet at least three times a year, and (iv) 
AC comprised of at least three members, 0 otherwise.
We run a regression analysis to examine the impact of ACE on FLD quantity and qual-
ity. The results in Table  6 show that the composite variable (ACE) has an insignificant 
effect on FLD quantity and quality. Returning to the results, the quality and quantity of 
FLD seems better explained by the separate effect of AC characteristics, rather than by a 
combined variable (as shown in the main regression of the paper). Also, by considering 
the AC characteristics separately, we get the exact impact of each individual characteristic 
rather than diluting it in one combined variable.
7.4  Impact of the interaction between ACE and Regulation on FLD quantity 
and quality
In a recent study, Al-Faryan and Dockery (2020) provide empirical evidence that corpo-
rate governance change positively affects market efficiency and hence increase the quality 
Table 6  Impact of ACE on FLD 
quantity and quality
* Coefficient is significant at 10%
** Coefficient is significant at 5%
*** Coefficient is significant at 1%
Variable definitions—see Sect. 4.2
Variables Quantity FLD Quality FLD
Model 1 Model 2
ACE 0.370  − 0.022




Relatives  − 2.556**  − 0.048**
Royal 2.482* 0.072**
_cons 4.939 0.789
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Years dummies Yes Yes
No. of obs 180 180
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.241 0.186
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of information by releasing reliable information to market participants. In addition, Gon-
tarek and Belghitar (2020) show that agency costs related to governance mechanisms (e.g. 
CEO duality) may be moderated by regulations. Therefore, to assess the robustness of the 
results, we run additional analysis to examine the effect of AC effectiveness on FLD quan-
tity and quality and how this relation is moderated by the release of the new code. A vari-
able (Regulation) has been created which takes the value of 1 for the period of 2017 and 
2018 (after the implementation of the revised code), and zero for the period from 2014 to 
2016 (before the revised code).
Models 1 and 2 in Table 7 show that the interaction variable combining ACE and Regu-
lation has a positive and significant impact on FLD quantity and quality at the 0.1 level. 
This means that ACE plays a positive role in enhancing the FLD practices in the period 
after the implementation of the new code. The results offer practical implications to regula-
tors to apply new and improve the existing provisions in the Omani code to enhance FLD.
7.5  Impact of the interaction between ACE and company characteristics on FLD 
quality
We undertake further sensitivity analysis to shed light on whether the AC effectiveness 
has an impact on the quality of FLD, by interacting with company characteristics, which 
may enhance or diminish this impact. The common characteristics used in the literature are 
company size, profitability, leverage and external auditor type (Big 4) (Ioannou and Sera-
feim 2017) which are found to have a significant impact on voluntary disclosure.
Table 7  Impact of the Interaction 
between ACE and regulation on 
FLD quantity and quality
* Coefficient is significant at 10%
** Coefficient is significant at 5%
*** Coefficient is significant at 1%
Variable definitions—see Sect. 4.2
Variables Quantity FLD Quality FLD
Model 1 Model 2
ACE 0.587  − 0.015
Regulation 1.130  − 0.008
ACE*Reg 0.012* 0.034*




Relatives  − 2.492**  − 0.048**
Royal 2.509* 0.073**
_cons 4.490 0.794
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Years dummies Yes Yes
No. of obs 180 180
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.245 0.192
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Table 8 illustrates four models using the interaction terms for each mentioned factor. 
Model 1 shows an insignificant impact of the interaction term (ACE*LogAsset) on FLD 
quality. According to interaction term (ACE*ROE) in Model 2, the coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, which indicates that ACE positively improves 
FLD quality in high profitable companies. This indicates that AC members of good profit-
able companies are encouraged to disclose high quality FLD as this might attract current 
and foreign investment. Moreover, the interaction term (ACE*LEV) in Model 3 presents 
a significant negative impact on FLD quality at the 0.05 level. This is because companies 
with high leverage are considered to be in high-risk which lead AC members to reduce 
FLD quality to ligitimise themselves for not attaining what they promise the stakeholders 
with. Furthermore, the interaction variable (ACE*Big4) in Model 4 shows a significant and 
negative impact on FLD quality at the 0.1 level. This indicates that ACE negatively influ-
ences FLD quality in companies audited by one of Big 4 auditors. This could be due to the 
recent high-profile scandals in Oman related to international auditors, such as KPMG and 
Moore Stephen, as these international auditors try not to encourage companies to report 
FLD, which might increase the legitimate costs if companies cannot attain what they prom-
ise the stakeholders. This could also harm Big 4 auditors’ reputation in the stock market, 
especially if the investors perceived a wrong signal, which could negatively effect on their 
investment decisions (Salem et al. 2019).
8  Conclusions
We examine the impact of AC characteristics on FLD over a 5 year period (2014–2018). 
This period relates to “before and after” significant policy updates to the CG code in which 
the AC function is being exercised. We find that AC characteristics affect FLD practices.
We find a significant positive relationship between AC interlocked members, AC size 
and AC female members and FLD quality. Conversely, the findings also suggest that AC 
independence, the frequency of AC meetings and ACs with financial expertise negatively 
affect FLD quality. It is also evident that FLD quantity is negatively affected by AC foreign 
and financial expertise.
These obtained insights contribute to expand previous CG and voluntary disclosure 
research in three significant ways. First, the study contributes to the body of knowledge 
by expanding the literature relating to AC characteristics and FLD, which provides a set of 
new characteristics (e.g. AC female members, foreign members on AC, AC share owner-
ship, AC interlocked members and AC financial and supervisory expertise) that have been 
examined for the first time in the Middle East.
Second, using the theoretical framework as a basis for explaining how each attribute 
of AC members could affect the level of FLD, our paper contributes to the literature on 
AC- disclosure by theoretically justifying and empirically examining the implications of 
three theories–agency, resource-dependence and social capital–with respect to FLD in the 
financial sector, with its attendant heavy regulation and strict supervision. These theories 
combine fruitfully with valid arguments to explain such phenomena.
Third, we contribute to the methodology by measuring the quantity and quality of FLD 
in the Omani context. We follow Beattie et  al.’s (2004) quality framework in measuring 
the quality of FLD by considering four attributes: financial, quantitative, disclosure tone 
and time period orientations. Interestingly, we also add to the body of disclosure literature 
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that there is no relationship between the quantity and the quality of FLD. Each measure 
represents its own meaning of disclosure; therefore, disclosure quantity should not be used 
as a proxy for quality. Furthermore, our study differs from the previous studies related to 
disclosure by conducting research on the financial sector rather than non-financial. Given 
that developed countries have formed the basis of most previous studies related to AC-
disclosure, this research also extends this issue into developing countries, where different 
market structures and regulations exist.
A number of interesting implications can be drawn from the findings of this study for 
regulators and academics. For regulators, the findings suggest that the role of ACs can be 
extended to ensure the quality of voluntary disclosure, and not just the financial reporting 
process. Regulators in Oman should, therefore, base on the recent regulatory changes and 
encourage ACs to ensure the quality of the overall reporting process to include different 
aspects of FLD, such as financial orientation, tone orientation, time orientation and quan-
titative orientation. These findings also have direct implications for the selection of AC 
members with specific characteristics to improve FLD quality, as the disclosure of such 
information is a mechanism with which to reduce information asymmetry in capital mar-
kets and to work towards the Oman Vision 2040 strategy.
Contrary to the commonly held view that an AC’s function is to detect financial report-
ing misstatements, this study’s findings show, for accounting academics and educators, 
that the role of the AC extends to FLD. This implies that ACs can play an integral role in 
recent calls for comprehensive corporate reporting. In terms of theoretical implications, the 
findings seem to support the grounds of agency, resource-dependence and social capital 
theories in regulatory reform settings. Agency theory suggests that the AC function offers 
a monitoring role that can potentially enhance the quality of corporate reporting, with 
resource-dependence theory suggesting that different AC characteristics bring specific and 
valuable resources to a firm and contribute to disclosure strategies. Social capital theory 
suggests that the business connections of AC members with different companies provide 
confidential information, which could help in strengthening FRQ. These theories, origi-
nally found applicable in a widely held ownership structure setting, explain the disclosure 
and governance practices in closely controlled business environments such as in Oman.
Despite the practical implications, there are a number of limitations in relation to the 
study. Our sample is considered small, due to the small size of Omani financial institutions. 
We focused only on the Omani context, which limits generalisability as disclosure prac-
tices may be affected by company type, industry and institutional context. Furthermore, we 
are aware of the effect that other board composition variables (e.g. board size and meeting) 
may have on disclosure quality.
Given the novelty of our study, we believe that our findings offer opportunities for future 
research. This research could be extended by analysing different institutional contexts. 
Future studies could also examine the impact of AC characteristics on voluntary risk dis-
closure, the cost of equity, credit rating, trade credit and companies’ performance. In addi-
tion, the Omani revised CG code prevented AC chair from being a member of any other 
committee within a company. However, it sets out the requirement for nomination and 
remuneration/compensation committees, which resulted in overlapping members across 
these committees. Further research could examine whether overlapping AC membership 
improve the FLD quantity and quality and which type of overlapping matters. Finally, it 
could be interesting to examine the impact of performance on FLD tone in financial insti-
tutions as this would help stakeholders to know whether managers are providing truthful 
explanation or engaging in impression management.
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